A manufacturer will often limit competition among downstream partners by authorizing only a select group of retailers to carry its product. However, it is not uncommon for authorized retailers to create an additional competitor by diverting units to an unauthorized seller. Prior research proposes that this diversion will not be optimal unless the diverted units are sold in new markets, expand demand, or take advantage of price differentials created by channel incentives. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that retailers sell to unauthorized sellers who then steal customers from the diverting retailer. This paper demonstrates in an analytical model that diversion from authorized retailers to an unauthorized direct competitor can occur even without previously viewed necessary conditions. In fact, diversion can represent a prisoner's dilemma whereby retailers diminish their own profit by selling to the unauthorized direct seller. The unauthorized direct seller earns greater profit by procuring fewer units from retailers than it could profitably sell to consumers even though such an order results in an equivalent increase in the quantity sold by the retailers. When authorized retailers are vertically differentiated, the inferior retailer diverts more units and has greater total sales than the higher quality retailer, though it has fewer sales to consumers.
diversion to different geographic markets takes advantage of the arbitrage opportunities created by disparity in wholesale prices, the above examples represent diversion within the same market. This is a practice known as channel flow diversion (Lowe and Rubin 1986) . Interestingly channel flow diversion can occur even if the unauthorized direct sellers ultimately steal customers from the retailer who divert the product in the first place. For instance, it is estimated that this diversion costs salons $100 million a year in lost sales (Gordon 1997) with one salon estimating a 10% loss in Aveda sales to unauthorized sellers (Palmer 2004 ).
The purpose of this paper is to resolve the discrepancy between theory and practice regarding channel flow diversion. Specifically, prior research has led to theory that sets out necessary conditions for diversion to occur. Notably, Duhan and Sheffet (1988) propose that diversion requires a price differential occurring due to currency exchange rates, differences in demand, or a segmentation strategy. While there are many examples of diversion that satisfy the necessary conditions (Antia, Bergen, Dutta, and Fisher 2006) , the trading card game producer mentioned above observed diversion in the absence of a necessary condition.
To summarize, the purpose of this paper is to answer the following research questions:
1. Why might diversion to a direct competitor occur in the absence of previously viewed necessary conditions? 2. What are the profit implications of the retailers' cost to divert when diversion occurs without previously viewed necessary conditions? 3. What are the implications for profit and diversion quantities of quality asymmetry between retailers when diversion occurs without previously viewed necessary conditions? 4. What is the optimal number of units that the unauthorized direct seller will want to divert from authorized retailers?
Concerning the first research question, the model overturns conventional wisdom and prior research by establishing an additional reason for channel flow diversion. I find that diversion to a competitor can occur even if the competitor does not expand the market and the retailer buys at a constant marginal cost per unit (i.e., no quantity discount schedule). In fact, retailers may divert to an unauthorized direct seller even if diversion represents a prisoner's dilemma.
The second research question is motivated by the fact that some products are more costly to divert than others. For instance, it costs more to ship heavier bottles of hair products than trading cards. Given the conditions under which diversion occurs, common intuition would suggest that retailers would earn greater profit when they have lower costs. Also, from an operations perspective, logic would suggest that if diversion is going to take place, it would be better for the process to be more efficient and less costly.
However, this paper identifies a strategic effect of diversion costs. In fact, the model finds that retailers' profits can be increase with increases in the cost to divert.
Third, retailers selling identical goods may create asymmetric value to customers via the level of service they provide such as qualified sales personnel, faster checkout lines and more parking (Moorthy and Zhang 2006) . Therefore, this research aims to offer predictions as to which retailer is more likely to divert to an unauthorized direct seller. On the one hand, a higher quality retailer may be more likely to divert since its quality affords it greater differentiation from the direct seller and thus diminished likelihood of lost sales. On the other hand, the higher quality retailer may be less likely to divert since it commands a higher selling price and thus each sale lost to the direct seller is more costly.
I also aim to determine whether the superior or inferior retailer will suffer greater profit loss from the presence of the unauthorized direct competitor. Intuitively, the superior retailer is more insulated from unauthorized direct seller due to its quality position. However, I show that inferior retailer may not only suffer less from the presence of the unauthorized direct seller, but even outperform the superior retailer.
In contrast to the three retailer-focused research questions, the final research question examines the unauthorized direct seller's decision. Specifically, because the procurement of diverted units occurs before the retail prices are set, an important question becomes whether the unauthorized direct seller will procure as many units as can profitably be sold. Research on quantity choice suggests that a Stackelberg leader will commit to a greater quantity than in a simultaneous move game as a means to encourage the followers to sell a lesser quantity. However, strategic quantity-commitments by all sellers have been shown to shift competition from Bertrand to Cournot and thus boost profit. Thus it is unclear whether an unauthorized direct seller would choose to 1) procure as many units as can be profitably sold, 2) strategically procure excess units, or 3) strategically procure fewer units. I show that in this situation, the unauthorized direct seller maximizes profit by strategically committing to buy a quantity of diverted units that will unilaterally constrain the unauthorized direct seller in subsequent pricing to consumers.
In total, the findings help to explain the intriguing phenomenon of within-market diversion and illustrate the consequences for pricing and profits. They demonstrate to manufacturers that diversion may not be avoided simply by ensuring there are no price differentials between markets. The findings inform manufacturers that lower-quality retailers are more likely to be the culprit of within-market diversion.
This paper demonstrates to retailers that technologies that reduce diversion costs do not necessarily increase profit even if diversion occurs and demonstrates to unauthorized direct sellers that the procurement of diverted units has strategic consequences that should be considered.
Literature Review
Channel flow diversion is a type of gray market. Duhan and Sheffet (1988) outline necessary conditions for gray market diversion to occur. The necessary condition overturned in the current research is a price differential occurring due to currency exchange rates, differences in demand, or a segmentation strategy.
The segmentation strategy is considered viable if there is downward sloping demand and the price differential can attract different segments. The latter condition is shown to increase manufacturer profit by Ahmadi and Yang (2000) and also Xiao, Palekar and Liu (2011) . 5 In my model, I show that these conditions are not necessary for channel flow diversion to occur. In fact, diversion is shown to be an equilibrium strategy even when total demand is fixed and segmentation across consumers results in lower prices without additional units sold. Thus, I find an additional reason for diversion that is not considered in the literature.
In this model I examine diversion when a manufacturer limits distribution to a select group of authorized retailers. Fein and Anderson (1997) use transaction cost theory to describe why manufacturers agree to selective distribution with distributors who agree to selective assortment. Dutta, Bergen, and John (1994) illustrate when a reseller will encroach upon another reseller's exclusive territory and when the manufacturer will tolerate some level of this encroachment. Kalnins (2004) empirically demonstrates that the markets of franchisees are often encroached by new franchises approved by the franchisor. In contrast, the current paper establishes that authorized retailers will create their own competition by diverting to an independent, unauthorized direct seller.
Another line of prior research examines the impact of authorized direct sellers on brick and mortar retailers. In a seminal paper, Balasubramanian (1998) and traditional retailers (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000; Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Rahman 2009; Overby and Jap 2009, Forman, Ghose, and Goldfarb 2009) . In contrast, this paper focuses on situations in which the manufacturer does not authorize a direct channel, yet the authorized retailers endogenously choose to divert to an unauthorized direct seller.
Transshipment literature finds that a retailer who experiences demand at the location exceeding the supply on-hand will be able to fulfill the order by buying from another retailer. For instance, a Macy's in
Chicago facing an order from a customer will be able to satisfy this order by getting a Macy's in a nearby suburb to transship to the store in Chicago. A body of transshipment research examines ordering and inventory decisions when transshipments between resellers are coordinated centrally (e.g., Lee 1987; Robinson 1990; Axsater 1990) . Companies using centralized transshipment benefit from risk pooling and hence offset the costs associated with transshipment. Transshipment between retailers can also occur when inventory orders and transshipment purchase decisions are made locally by the independent resellers (e.g., Rudi, Kapur and Pyke 2001; Hu, Duenyas, and Kapuscinski 2007; Huang and Sosic 2010) .
Whereas the focus in transshipment literature is how firms cooperatively adjust regional supply to match regional demand, diversion between non-cooperative players occurs in the model presented below.
The finding that retailers may divert to a direct competitor even if the end result is a reduction in profit contributes to the growing body of research identifying prisoners' dilemmas that firms face in a broad range of marketing contexts. Prior research finds that prisoner's dilemmas arise in targeted coupons (e.g., Shaffer and Zhang 1995; Chen, Narasimhan, and Zhang 2001) , channel-partner choice (Coughlan 1985) , loss-leader pricing with rain checks (Hess and Gerstner 1987) , advertising (e.g., Chen, Joshi, Raju, and Zhang 2009), and exchange programs (Desai, Purohit, and Zhou 2011) . This research demonstrates when retailers cannot govern themselves from engaging in self-defeating diversion to a direct seller.
Finally, I identify the optimal number of diverted units ordered by the unauthorized direct seller. Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) find that capacity commitment can move undifferentiated competitors from Bertrand (and hence zero profit) to Cournot (and hence positive profit) competition. Similarly, Maggi (1996) finds that differentiated competitors can mitigate competition via quantity commitments. Thus competition intensity can be reduced when both firms commit to quantity before choosing pricing. When one firm commits to quantity, Daughety (1990) finds a Stackelberg leader will commit to a greater quantity than in a simultaneous move game. In contrast, I find a scenario in which one seller (the unauthorized direct seller) commits to a lesser quantity even though its competitors are not only unconstrained but also sell greater quantities than if no quantity commitment were made.
In summary, I make several main contributions to the existing literature. First, I demonstrate how diversion can occur without the previously assumed necessary conditions. This occurs even if diversion results in less profit for the authorized retailers who divert. Secondly, this is the first research to show that the profit of a retailer who diverts is increasing in the per-unit cost to divert. Third, this is the first research to show how diversion to an unauthorized direct competitor differentially affects asymmetric retailers. Finally, I am the first to show how a unilateral commitment to a lower quantity by the unauthorized direct seller can improve profit even when it results in an equivalent increase in quantity sold by the competing retailers.
The Model
In this section, I describe the players of the game and their payoff functions. All notations are summarized in Table 1 . There are four types of players in the game. There are horizontally differentiated authorized retailers who procure units from the manufacturer. There is an unauthorized direct seller who only has access to units if it can buy them from the authorized retailers. There are consumers who are heterogeneous in their preference for sellers. There is a manufacturer who produces a single product and relies on intermediaries to reach consumers. Authorized retailers and the direct seller negotiate diversion terms
Retail prices and direct selling price are set simultaneously Consumers decide from whom to buy
Firms

Authorized Retailers
There are N authorized retailers distributed evenly along the Salop circle (with location of retailer j denoted by x j ) who procure products from the manufacturer at a per-unit rate of w in a single-period. 
Unauthorized Direct Seller
There is a direct seller located in the center of circle. In this paper, I focus on the scenario when the manufacturer does not authorize the direct seller. Reasons often cited for selective distribution of this kind include diminished incentive for retailers to provide service because of a direct seller's free-riding (Carlton and Chevalier 2001) , a higher incidence of product returns in direct channels, 7 diminished manufacturer control of product information (Luechtefeld 2008) , and protection of the brand name value.
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While the model parsimoniously abstracts from many of these factors, I prove analytically in Appendix B that market-expanding service by retailers with free-riding on this service by the direct seller can lead the manufacturer to optimally leave the direct seller unauthorized. The unauthorized direct seller incurs a 6 Consider, for example, a market already in pure retail entry equilibrium prior to the emergence of the unauthorized direct seller as also considered by Balasubramanian (1998 Palmer (2004) . 12 See Luechtefeld (2008) .
Manufacturer
The focus of this paper is the diversion from authorized retailers to the unauthorized direct seller. While the manufacturer's choice of w is treated as exogenous, the results will be shown to hold for any w. Thus analysis of the manufacturer's pricing decision is omitted. While the manufacturer's choice of N is treated as a parameter in this model, the equilibrium value of N depends on the retailer's entry cost. The manufacturer's decision not to authorize the direct seller is also treated as given; though in Appendix B, it is shown how the decision by the manufacturer not to authorize the direct seller may be optimal.
Consumers
Total consumer demand is inelastic (i.e., the reservation value is sufficiently high). The discussion section remarks upon the robustness of the findings to this assumption. Utility of buying from retailer j for consumer i, who is located at θ i , is equal to
where u is the reservation utility from owning the product and t is the transportation cost. Consumers buy at most one unit of the product and their locations are uniformly distributed along the unit circle. A proportion α of consumers will derive utility from buying from the unauthorized direct seller equal to (u-μ-p d ) where μ is a measure of the lack of fit with the unauthorized direct seller. The lack of fit from the unauthorized direct seller, μ, captures the inconvenience of waiting for delivery, the inability to talk to a live salesperson, the cost of shipping, or the perceived reliability of the direct seller. Thus, they will buy from the unauthorized direct seller if
 and will purchase from retailer j that maximizes
otherwise. Notice that although μ is constant across consumers, the formulation of the model captures the empirically validated phenomenon that preference for buying online versus buying in the store depends on the consumer's location (Forman, Ghose, and Goldfarb 2009) . The remaining (1-α) consumers will not consider the unauthorized direct seller and will purchase from retailer j that maximizes
Potential reasons why a consumer may not consider the direct seller include: lack of awareness of the direct seller's existence, concern regarding purchase through an unauthorized seller, significant impatience in receiving the product, or reliance on live salespersons. 
Equilibrium Diversion
In this section, I explore whether diversion from authorized sellers to an unauthorized seller can occur in equilibrium when there is a fixed market size. To this end, I impose no assumptions on the process by which the diversion agreement is established. Instead, I solve generally for whether a mutual diversion agreement can be made between parties. For any given quantity of diverted units from each authorized retailer, t q , I examine whether the unauthorized direct seller's willingness to pay per unit is greater than the lowest acceptable price that an authorized retailer would accept in exchange for diverting the units.
The order of analysis is as follows. I first establish equilibrium pricing and payoffs for the following subgames: The unauthorized seller is unable to procure units or there are S authorized retailers
) that each divert t q units to the unauthorized direct seller. I then determine whether the minimum diversion price such that all authorized retailers divert and no authorized retailer would unilaterally deviate is less than or equal to the diversion price such that the unauthorized direct seller would be willing to buy from the N firms. I then remark upon the manufacturer's stage one decisions. 
Proposition 1 demonstrates that it can be an equilibrium strategy for retailers to fuel their direct competition even if the diversion does not expand the market or allow the authorized retailers to tap into new markets. This result is new to the literature. The specific agreement between a retailer and the unauthorized direct seller depends on the bargaining process, though the proposition establishes a range of diversion quantities and diversion prices such that the retailer and the unauthorized direct seller will prefer to reach an agreement. Interestingly, diversion occurs in equilibrium even though the number of diverted units by each retailer in the diversion equilibrium is equal to the number of customers the direct seller steals from each authorized retailer (i.e., j  ,
Moreover, it is feasible that the diversion price is below the selling price that would arise without diversion (i.e.,
). In other words, diversion can occur even when every sale to the unauthorized direct retailer comes at a lower price than the resulting lost sale to consumers.
While it is counterintuitive for a retailer to sell its stock to a direct competitor at a lower price than could be sold to consumers, the finding makes sense when one considers the strategic interaction between players. The profit loss associated with an authorized retailer stocking the competition with diverted units is distributed across all competing authorized sellers. Therefore, the marginal loss to each firm from the additional competitor is less than the gain from the trade. Moreover, each firm recognizes that if they do not cooperate with the unauthorized direct seller, the competing authorized retailers will. Thus diversion within a fixed market size can still occur even if the diversion price is less than the retail price of the sale that is lost to the direct seller.
Notice that the number of diverted units does not depend on the wholesale price or fixed fee charged by the manufacturer. Neither does the range of potential diversion prices (i.e.,
Therefore, Proposition 1 holds generally regardless of the elements of a linear contract between the manufacturer and authorized retailers.
To this point I have shown that diversion can occur in equilibrium even if there is a fixed market size.
To determine the specific quantity and diversion price that is agreed upon between the unauthorized direct seller and N authorized sellers requires additional assumptions regarding how the agreement is made. In the following section, I examine implications for a case in which the unauthorized direct seller has the power to make take-it-or-leave it offers to the retailers.
Implications of Diversion
In this section, I make an additional assumption regarding the sequence of events. I assume that the unauthorized direct seller makes symmetric take-it-or-leave-it offers simultaneously to each of the N authorized retailers regarding the quantity to buy from the retailer and the diversion price to pay per unit The equilibrium outcome is solved via backward induction and is described in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 When the unauthorized direct seller makes take-it-or-leave-it to the N retailers, then diversion from the N authorized retailers to the unauthorized direct seller will occur in equilibrium if the consumer cost of shopping from the direct seller is not too great. Specifically, each authorized retailer will divert
where  is defined in the Appendix.
Lemma 3 identifies the specific quantity of diverted units that each authorized seller will provide. I restrict attention to values of  such that the authorized retailers do not maximize profit over the (1 )   consumers who only consider authorized retailers and forsake the consumers who also consider the unauthorized direct seller (i.e.,    as defined in the Appendix). The equilibrium prices, quantities, and profits are presented in Table 2 . I next look at the unauthorized direct seller's ordering decision. 
Quantity sold to Consumers by Each Authorized Retailer 
. However, the unauthorized direct seller will limit itself to procuring
units. While a typical game in which a firm can Stackelberg lead in its choice of quantity will lead to a higher choice of quantity than a simultaneous move game (Daughety 1990) , here the unauthorized direct seller boosts profit by strategically buying fewer units than would subsequently be optimal to sell. In my model, the inability to procure units directly from the manufacturer presents the unauthorized direct seller an opportunity to credibly constrain capacity in its offer to buy from authorized retailers. By buying a lesser quantity from the authorized retailers, the unauthorized direct seller mitigates price competition and raises equilibrium prices by all sellers. This is counter-intuitive given that the unilateral commitment to a lower quantity results in a greater quantity sold by the authorized resellers who could still choose to drive down prices.
This capacity constraint, though, limits the unauthorized direct seller's incentive to cut price because it cannot serve demand beyond its supply of units. Also, the diversion price, d
w , paid to the authorized retailers is higher with the constrained capacity, further diminishing the unauthorized direct seller's incentive to cut price. As a consequence, the competing retailers can be less aggressive on price and still achieve sales of a given quantity. Thus, the unauthorized direct seller's unilateral commitment to divert fewer units than would subsequently be optimal to sell softens price competition and benefits all sellers.
It should be noted that this result occurs when the diversion agreements are established before the selling prices. However, logic suggests it is robust to the assumption that the unauthorized direct seller makes take-it-or-leave it offers. This is because, in a bargaining game, the equilibrium quantity and wholesale price will lie somewhere between the retailers' preferred values and the unauthorized direct seller's preferred values. Thus, if the unauthorized direct seller has sufficient bargaining power, the resulting quantity will be close to the take-it-or-leave offer equilibrium and thus will still constrain the pricing game.
I now turn attention to retailer profitability when diversion occurs. The following proposition demonstrates that the presence of the unauthorized direct seller can reduce retailer profit even though the retailers have the power to collectively starve the direct seller.
Proposition 3 The opportunity to divert to the unauthorized direct seller can represent a prisoner's dilemma whereby each authorized seller earns less profit than if diversion were not feasible.
The key insight from Proposition 3 is that improved profitability is not a necessary condition for diversion. In fact, retailers may choose to help a direct competitor come into existence even if the diversion results in diminished profit. The reason is that the unauthorized direct seller will be able to come to a mutually beneficial agreement with at least one authorized retailer who recognizes that of the t q units diverted only / t q N will steal from that retailer's customer base. Each firm would prefer to sell to the direct competitor than have the direct competitor's request fulfilled by the remaining authorized retailers. Therefore, even in the parameter range such that the existence of the direct competitor reduces retailer profit, diversion will occur in equilibrium.
It should be noted that Proposition 3 is not meant to suggest that diversion always represents a prisoner's dilemma. In this model, market size is fixed. While this assumption helps demonstrate a novel strategic reason for diversion in the absence of previously viewed necessary conditions, it is possible that the unauthorized direct seller instead helps to expand the market. Logically, the profitability of diversion for the authorized retailers (relative to when diversion is infeasible) is increasing in degree to which the unauthorized direct seller attracts new consumers to the market. Proposition 3 is robust to small levels of market-expansion by the unauthorized direct seller since the profit difference between when diversion is feasible and when it is not feasible is strictly negative with a fixed market size.
Next I consider the impact of retailer diversion costs on profitability. Recall that retailers face a per-unit cost of transshipping units to the unauthorized direct seller. These costs include administrative hours in processing, packing and reshipping, as well as shipping charges paid to a third party. In the following proposition, I describe how these diversion costs affect profitability. Proposition 4 demonstrates the counter-intuitive result that a reduction in costs would actually reduce profit. This result is driven by the strategic implications of diversion costs. When a retailer incurs a greater cost per unit to divert, it will demand a greater diversion price from the unauthorized direct seller.
The greater diversion price has two implications for the unauthorized direct seller. First, the unauthorized direct seller passes these costs on to consumers in the form of higher prices. Second, the unauthorized retailer will prefer to buy fewer units from the retailers than with a lower diversion price. These effects result in two benefits to the retailers: a greater number of units sold to consumers and a higher retail price.
So, while the direct effect of the diversion cost is a lower profit from diversion, the strategic effects boost profit via higher prices and retail quantities.
In the following section, I explore the implications of vertical differentiation between retailers. Though the value of the product itself remains the same across retailers, retailer actions may positively affect the consumer's willingness to pay in buying from that specific retailer. I identify the equilibrium diversion strategy and profit implications with this additional consideration.
Implications of Retailer Asymmetry
In this extension, I consider the diversion behavior by vertically differentiated retailers. There are two objectives of this extension. First, it demonstrates that diversion to a direct competitor can occur when firms are asymmetric. Second, it identifies the impact of a retailer's vertical position on its diversion behavior and profit. On the one hand, a higher quality retailer may be more likely to divert since its quality affords it greater differentiation from the direct seller and thus diminished likelihood of lost sales.
On the other hand, the higher quality retailer may be less likely to divert since it commands a higher selling price and thus each sale lost to the direct seller is more costly. To identify the impact of vertical differentiation on diversion behavior, I make several modifications to the main model.
In the interest of parsimony, I consider N=2 firms. The reservation value for consumers purchasing from retailer 1 located at 1 0 x  is u+ whereas the reservation value for consumers purchasing from retailer 2 located at 2 1/ 2 x  is u. Thus, the parameter δ captures the difference in retailer quality.
Without loss of generality, consumers are homogeneous in their preference for quality and the consumer location,  , captures consumer heterogeneity in preferences between retailers.
It should be noted that the product sold by each retailer has equivalent value (and thus are undifferentiated when diverted to the unauthorized seller), but the utility from purchasing from the higher quality retailer is enhanced by the retailer service outputs (see also Moorthy and Zhang 2006) . As in Kuksov and Lin (2010) , I allow higher quality to come at a higher marginal cost. Thus, in addition to the wholesale price that each retailer pays per unit acquired, the higher quality retailer has an additional cost per unit sold to consumers equal to v c . I consider the case when the cost difference is less than the value difference (i.e., v c   ) and the consumer located at the midpoint between two retailers will get greater disutility from buying from a retailer than from buying from the unauthorized direct seller (i.e., 4 t
 
).
It should be noted that the results are preserved when firms have the same marginal costs (i.e., The game is solved via backward induction. Proposition 5 establishes the equilibrium diversion result. ( 4 ) 2(8 15 )
, both retailers will divert.
For greater quality differences between retailers (i.e., The intuition behind Proposition 5 relies on the incentives for each firm to divert. The marginal benefit to a retailer of diverting is the sale to the direct seller that may come at the expense of the retail competitor. The marginal loss to a retailer of diverting is a function of the difference in value between the selling price to consumers and the diversion price charged to the direct seller. For the higher quality retailer, the marginal loss is greater. Thus the quantity of diverted units such that the marginal benefit equals the marginal loss is less for the high quality retailer than for the low quality retailer. This effect trumps the fact that the direct seller is a more distant competitor with the high quality retailer than the low quality retailer (as measured by the quality differential). In the following Proposition, I compare profit and total sales from the high quality retailer to the low quality retailer.
Proposition 6 When the unauthorized direct seller makes take-it-or-leave offers to purchase diverted units from both retailers (i.e.,
(3 )( 4 ) 2(8 15 )
v t c             ),
the high quality retailer earns less profit than the low quality retailer even if the retailers share the same marginal cost of sales. The total quantity of sales by the high quality retailer (retail sales plus diverted units) is less than the total quantity of sales by the low quality retailer.
Proposition 6 highlights the strategic effect of product diversion on asymmetric firms. The high quality firm earns a higher margin per unit sold to consumers and sells more units to consumers than the low quality retailer. However, this blessing turns out to be a curse in the presence of an unauthorized direct seller. Given the value to the retailer of the authorized sales to consumers, the high quality retailer is more hesitant to divert to the direct competitor. However, the low-quality retailer is more eager to divert to the direct competitor. The profit result is then driven by the total sales by each player.
The comparison of total sales by each player is in inversely rlated to the comparison of sales when there is no diversion. When there is no unauthorized direct channel, the high quality retailer sells a greater quantity than the low quality firm. However, the low quality retailer has a much higher incentive, on the margin, to sell diverted units. The high quality retailer's resistance, on the margin, to eroding profit margin on sales via diversion to the direct competitor makes the low quality firm a more attractive business partner to the unauthorized direct seller. Hence while the high quality retailer sells more units to consumers, the low quality retailer more than makes up for this difference with the number of additional diverted units.
Proposition 6 has implications for manufacturers who wish to clamp down on diversion. Without diversion, the high quality retailer will order a greater quantity than the low quality retailer. However, this is reversed in the presence of diversion. Whereas monitoring in the symmetric case is made difficult by the fact that each retailer orders the same quantity, order quantity in the asymmetric retailer case can be a good indicator of diversion. Thus, manufacturers can identify a retailer who is diverting when there are quality differences by determining if the retailer's order quantity is counter to its quality position.
Discussion
This paper demonstrates how diversion to a direct competitor can occur even without market expansion or non-linear wholesale pricing. As a result, previously viewed necessary conditions for diversion need not hold. There is evidence that suggests retailers will sell to unauthorized dealers even though the action intensifies competition and reduces profit. The model provides a reason for why retailers might take this detrimental action.
When channel flow diversion occurs, retailers actually earn greater profit when incurring a greater cost of diverting. For example, if the product being sold is bulky and expensive to ship to the unauthorized direct seller, then profit will be greater than if the product is easy and inexpensive to ship. While higher costs have a negative direct effect on retailer profit, the strategic implications are higher retail prices and higher quantities sold to consumers. In this context, the strategic effects outweigh the direct effect and result in greater profitability.
While diversion may be an equilibrium strategy for authorized retailers, it is shown that this equilibrium strategy may result in lower profit than if diversion were not possible. Thus channel flow diversion can represent a prisoner's dilemma if the direct seller does not significantly expand the market for the product. This finding contributes to the growing body of marketing research that identifies marketing variables implemented by firms that reduce profit in equilibrium.
It should be noted that the model abstracts from the fact that, in some industries, the unauthorized direct seller has the ability to expand the market of consumers. This is a positive direct effect and logically the prisoner's dilemma could be transformed to a conditional effect depending on the level of market expansion by the unauthorized direct seller. The model also examines a linear wholesale contract. As described in previous literature, the combination of a quantity-discount schedule and a market-expanding unauthorized channel are ripe conditions for diversion and would serve as another direct positive effect of diversion. These conditions would also amplify the negative direct effect of diversion cost on retailer profits. As such both results are conditional on the extent to which the unauthorized seller expands the market and the discount schedule offered by the manufacturer.
Moreover, the stylized main model suggests that all retailers divert whereas this is rarely seen in practice. Asymmetry in retailer quality is one way in which the symmetric results are overturned. The vertical differentiation among retailers demonstrates why the low quality retailers are more likely to divert than the high quality retailers. It also shows how this diversion can actually lead the lower quality retailer to earn greater profit than the higher quality retailer. The high quality retailer's hesitance, on the margin, to divert units provides an opportunity for the lower quality retailer to make up for the consumer sales differential with more sales to the unauthorized direct seller. This finding has implications for manufacturers attempting to monitor diversion behaviors.
Managers should continue to recognize that retailers in closed markets have incentive to engage in channel flow diversion to unauthorized direct sellers even without quantity discounts. 
The unauthorized direct seller earns profit equal to
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Lemma 2 When S authorized sellers each divert t q units to the unauthorized direct seller and the unauthorized direct seller is constrained by the supply of diverted units (i.e.,
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Proof of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2
Consider retailer A that diverts. Contribution (profit gross of any fixed costs) for retailer A is ( ) Therefore, the total quantity sold by the unauthorized direct seller is equal to 
Suppose S retailers each sell t q to the unauthorized direct seller. The total units available to the direct seller will be equal to S t q . The direct seller has the following constrained optimization problem where  is the Lagrange multiplier.
, max ( , ) (
Since the retailer pricing game is symmetric, I solve for the retail price 
Lemma 2 presents the resulting simplified prices and profit when
For completeness, it must also be shown that retailer A will not choose to ignore the α consumers who consider the unauthorized direct seller. If all other retailers choose * p , the best profit retailer A can earn, not including revenue from diversion, by ignoring the unauthorized direct seller is
. At the equilibrium in Lemma 1, this profit is 2 2
(1 )(2 )( (2 (2 )) 2 (1 )( ) (1 2 ) 2 (1 ) ) 4 (1 ) (1 2 )
. At the equilibrium in Lemma 2, this profit is 2 2 2
(1 )(2 ) 4 (1 )
. Therefore, no retailer would prefer to ignore the consumers who consider the unauthorized direct seller at the equilibrium in Lemma 1 if 2 2
. Simplifying the comparison of profits, no retailer would prefer to ignore the consumers who consider the unauthorized direct seller at the equilibrium in Lemma 2 if 2 2
(1 )(2 ) 4(1 )(1 )
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider when the quantity of diverted units supplied to the unauthorized direct seller is equal to or less than the quantity of units that would be sold to consumers by the unauthorized direct seller. (1 ) 2 (1 ) 
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3:
As shown in Proposition 1, if 0<S<N firms are willing to divert a quantity t q in equilibrium, then N firms will divert t q . As such, I look at the unauthorized direct seller's payoff from N retailers diverting (see 
Direct Seller Quantity is Unconstrained in the Pricing Game
The unauthorized direct seller's profit is presented in Lemma 1. The equilibrium pricing leads to a total quantity diverted equal to 
Comparing Quantity-Constrained Profit to Unconstrained Profit
Comparing payoffs above, the difference between constrained profit and unconstrained profit is equal to * * * 4 3 2 2 2
( 1 ) 
For completeness, I must verify the conditions for which the retailers will not choose to focus only on the 1   consumers who do not consider the unauthorized direct seller, thereby forsaking  consumers.
In other words, would a retailer prefer to maximize 
Proof of Proposition 2
By Lemma 3, profit from constraining quantity by buying
is greater than profit from unconstrained quantity of 2 ** 2
Proof of Propositions 3 and 4
Pprofit with diversion is increasing in c: 
To verify that this critical point is a maximum rather than a minimum, I take the derivative of profit through this point. Let q  denote the vector of choice variables at the critical point. The partial derivatives through this vector are Carlton and Chevalier (2001) hypothesize that manufacturers that rely strongly upon physical sales effort may limit the availability of their products on the internet to control the free-rider problem. For example, manufacturers of salon products cite the importance of salons in helping consumers understand the value of the product. 13 In this appendix, I demonstrate that online free-riding of market expanding effort can lead to fewer manufacturer sales and thus be an impetus for the manufacturer to not authorize the direct seller. To this end, I model a specific form of effort, though the finding is robust to several modifications.
APPENDIX B. IMPACT ON MARKET EXPANDING EFFORT
The purpose of this model is not to definitively prove why manufacturers, in some cases, do not authorize online direct sellers. Rather, it demonstrates a context that leads a manufacturer to authorize only serviceproviding brick-and-mortar retailers. Moreover, it shows why retailer diversion to the unauthorized direct seller can be a concern for the manufacturer. It should be noted that this appendix abstracts from the The market expansion can be in the form of either new consumers from the same location or additional purchases by existing consumers. The effort includes sales assistance, events, flyers, or advertisements that boost the awareness or value of the brand for the exposed consumers. Consider the lead-in example.
13 From Palmer (2004) : "Consumers don't know if a product is going to give them the results they want without the help from stylists."
Retailers who host in-store gaming events will afford its participants greater value out of purchasing the trading cards used in the game. Moreover, the in-store gaming can build greater awareness and lead participants to encourage new customers to try the product. Consider also the value of salons in terms of helping customers use products best suited to the customer's hair type, thereby increasing the value and the demand of the hair product. While the retailer benefits from the increased brand value or customer base, some consumers may choose to buy from the online seller (if there is one). In stage 0, the manufacturer decides whether or not to authorize the direct seller. In stage 1, the retailers simultaneously choose effort. In stage 2, the retailers and direct seller simultaneously choose prices. (1 )( (2 ) 2 ) [( ( (2 ) (1 ) (8 9 3 )) 64
( 1 2 ) 4 (1 )(2 (1 3 )) 4 (1 )( 3 ) )] In this set-up, it is also easy to see why diversion by the retailers has an adverse effect on manufacturer profitability. Cross, Stephans, and Benjamin (1990) point out that unauthorized sellers can free ride on the promotion and service provide by the authorized channel members. Practitioners often cite the retailers'
incentive to provide valuable service as an important factor in manufacturer decisions. 14 Let effort be simultaneously set before the stages of the game depicted in Figure 1 / t N and both are independent of the manufacturer's wholesale price, the effort levels by the retailers and consequently the manufacturer's sales will be less when there is diversion in equilibrium than when diversion can be prevented.
Thus this Appendix has proven when an unauthorized direct seller free-rides on retailer marketexpanding effort, diversion can lead to diminished manufacturer sales relative to when the free-riding online sellers are not authorized (for any linear wholesale contract). The intuition of managers and the logic behind why within-market, channel-flow diversion can be a concern for manufacturers is confirmed.
While the logic holds for a variety of different models of market-expanding effort, there are other factors such as market expansion, contract negotiation costs, or scale economies that may lead a manufacturer to benefit from diversion or prefer to authorize direct sellers. However, this Appendix demonstrates that diversion can occur in a set-up in which the manufacturer does not authorize the direct seller.
